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sponsored attacks of certain types. 
It matters little if hostile forces de-
stroy an electrical generator via a 
kinetic weapon or by taking over 
a control computer; either way, it 
could be considered an act of war. 
But who launched the attack? A 
garden-variety hacker? A foreign 
military? Private parties acting at 
the direction—or with the tacit 
approval—of a foreign govern-
ment? The answer to the core 
question is generally quite unclear, 
as in the recent denial-of-service 
attacks against Estonia, Georgia, 
and Kyrgyzstan. Perhaps there’s 
historical precedent: are officially 
sponsored cyberattacks the latter-
day equivalent to letters of marque 
and reprisal? Do we want to return 
to those days?
To complicate matters further, 
even financial crime can be tied 
to other governments. Repeated 
reports indicate that some coun-
tries are willing to tolerate any sort 
of fraud and hacking as long as it’s 
aimed externally. Indeed, it was 
deemed newsworthy that the recent 
Conficker/Downadup worm didn’t 
infect machines with a Ukrainian 
keyboard. Is this casus belli?
None of these questions have 
pat answers. Even if current laws 
can be stretched to answer them, 
those laws probably still couldn’t 
give the right answer. Essentially, 
we need an international answer 
because there’s no 12-mile limit in 
cyberspace. The discussion needs 
to begin sooner rather than later. 
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the answer depends on how we 
view the problem.
Most classic hacking was treat-
ed as petty crime, but attacker 
motives today have changed. 
Most hacking is done for pecu-
niary reasons, but a noticeable 
amount seems to be done to ad-
vance national goals. The different 
 scenarios pose different questions.
In the US, at least, responsi-
bility for protection against or-
dinary criminal behavior is split 
between the government and 
private citizens. While investiga-
tion, apprehension, prosecution, 
and punishment or retribution 
are generally governmental roles, 
individuals are expected to take 
reasonable steps to protect them-
selves: houses have locks, keys 
shouldn’t be left in cars, and so on. 
That said, beyond a certain point, 
most people expect the govern-
ment to take over.
Jurisdictional issues add to the 
muddle. Even if counterhacking 
is legal in the victim’s locale, it 
might not be in the attacker’s. Is 
hot pursuit legal in cyberspace? 
Across national boundaries? Can 
the victim even tell where the at-
tacker is? Botnets, reflector attacks, 
and stepping stones aside, IP geo-
location is inherently imprecise.
Simply put, reality is different in 
cyberspace. Although it might have 
a similar legal regime, the law’s de-
terrent ability is almost nil. People 
aren’t expected to live inside bank 
vaults, but many advocate running 
computer networks that way. Even 
Texas doesn’t seem to permit it 
today, but in the absence of effec-
tive law enforcement, should this 
change? The difficulty of accurate 
attacker identification is, of course, 
a complicating factor.
The situation is more complex in 
attacks by nation-states. In general, 
individuals have little expectation 
that they should be able to protect 
themselves against foreign govern-
ments, the 1950s craze for fallout 
shelters notwithstanding. Do we 
expect people to protect themselves 
against other governments? Is this a 
reasonable expectation?
The nature of a governmental 
response is even less clear. Are such 
attacks espionage, whether directed 
against the private sector or the gov-
ernment? If so, the response would 
normally involve counterintelli-
gence units and the legal process. 
But if we consider them physical 
intrusions, akin to reconnaissance 
aircraft, is a direct response—cyber 
or physical—justified? 
The theoretical answer, al-
though not the reality, is rather 
clearer in the event of officially 
W
e all realize that computer security is a 
serious problem. But who should solve 
it? More precisely, who should be re-
sponsible for coping with computer inse-
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